Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 24

Issue 1

Article 10

1935

Parent and Child--Can a Parent Emancipate Without his Consent?
Howard H. Whitehead
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Family Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Whitehead, Howard H. (1935) "Parent and Child--Can a Parent Emancipate Without his Consent?,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol24/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT NoTES
Alcorn it may be doubted whether Wheeler v. Gahan would now be followed in Kentucky."
Regardless of what may be the true meaning of the words in the
Wheeler case, the Kentucky court definitely reaffirmed the doctrine
that the vendee becomes the equitable owner from the date of the
contract in the case of Benjamin v. Dinwiddie,2 though not referring
specifically to the risk of loss.
In view of the extreme meagreness of case authority for the proposition that the risk of loss should be upon the vendor it is to be seriously doubted that many courts will feel inclined to change their
present views. The change, if any, will probably come from the legislature.
But regardless of the source of the change, it is the firm conviction of this writer that the risk of loss should be borne by the party
who is in possession. Cogent reasons seem to demand such a change:
(1) The analogous situation of contracts for the sale of chattels where
the vendee has the risk of loss. 2) The better position of the party
in possession to take steps to protect his interest. (3) The common
belief of laymen who contract with reference to real estate that the
risk of loss is on the one in possession. (4) Such a,holding will practically always effectuate the ntention of the parties. (5) The arguments of such authorities as Williston, Stone, and Langdell. (6) The
extremely narrow and isolated application of the present rule, i. e,, to
contracts for the conveyance of a fee simple in realty. (7) The "homespun justice" of the rule.
ROBERT EDwI HlAwoNT1, J3.

PARENT AND CHILD-CAN A
MINOR WITHOUT HIS CONSENT?

PARENT

EMANCIPATE

A

The problem stated briefly is to determine the age, if at all, at
which a father can emancipate his son, without that son's consent,
without rendering himself liable criminally for non-support or aban.
donment, and, at the same time, avoiding liability for debts made by
the son, by pledging his father's credit for necessaries.
The statement that the law must, in case of emancipation, give
its primary consideration to-the rights and welfare of the infant implies that there are other elements for legal consideration. That is so,
The financial condition of the parent is important. If we were to
set an arbitrary age at which emancipation could occur, we would
make a mistake which, after a few decisions, would become so evident as to demand rectification. In a West Virginia case1 a father
had become insolvent and his creditors sought to levy on crops raised
by the labor of the minor child. It was there held that a parent in"iupra,note 15.
ITrapnell, et al. v. Conklyn, et al., 37 W. Va. 242, 16 S. E. 570
(1892).
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volved in hopeless insolvency could emancipate his child of eighteen
and remove his services and earnings from the grasp of creditors.
And it was held that the fact that the child still remained at home
created no estoppel to the claim of emancipation. Had we here set
an arbitrary age or disallowed emancipation until the infant reached
legal age, we would have subjected the infant to the debts of his
father for three years, during which time he would be unable to make
a decent living or to lay aside funds with which to educate himself.
In this case the welfare of the infant had to be considered In the light
of the present and probable future financial condition of his father.
But, in this case, it.is certain that the infant gave his consent to be
emancipated so that the product of his labor could be removed from
the grasp of creditors. Leaving out these circumstances so that the
consent of the child cannot be Implied, could his father have emancipated him? Another case decided a few years earlier in the same
state' held that a father may voluntarily relinquish his right to his
child's earnings, and when he does so, the child is said to be emancipated. This case also advances the proposition' that a father is entitled to the earnings of the child at least until the child is fourteen
years of age; the weight of modern authority is that the father has
the right to a child's earnings until he reaches legal age.3 As may be
seen, these cases deal only with -the right of the father to waive his
rights in regard to the child.
After a careful perusal of cases affected by the general problem of
emancipation one would, come to the conclusion that extremely few, if
any cases, have ever directly been decided on the point of involuntary
emancipation. The cases when touching the point, have been decisions
as to the right of the child to his own earnings as against the right
of the father to them, the element of emancipation being treated as
already settled. In these cases the question whether the emancipation
was effected legally or illegally by the father was not treated because
the present purpose of the court was to protect the interests of the
child. Many cases may be found which hold that a father has a right
to renounce his common law right to his son's services and to give
the minor child the benefit of his earnings.' The question which we
are endeavoring to answer is, has he the power to renounce his common law duties as regards that son? These cases all presuppose that
the child has a method of earning, and, hence, is willing to be emancipated. The point in these cases is that the child has a means of live21-alliday v. Miller, 29 W. Va. 424, 6 Am. St. Rep. 653 (1897).
'Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956 (1909);
Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Guinn's Guardian, 231 Ky. 772, 22 S. W. (2d)
300 (1929) (case expressly states that parent has right to earnings
until the child reaches 21); State, for Use of Strepay v. Cohen, 172
Atl. 274 (1934).
'Inhabitants of Town of Liberty v. Inhabitants of Town of Levant,
122 Me. 300, 119 Atl. 811 (1923); Mathews v. Fields, 12 Ga. App. 225,
77 S. E. 11 (1913).
(By statute, Civil Code 1910, Section 3021.)
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lhood and wishes to be left alone to enjoy it, without the common
law obligation to turn over his earnings to his parents. The writer
finds no case directly holding, as a part of its decision, that a father
may renounce all parental duties in regard to a child who is under
legal age.
There is dictum in a Kentucky case which would seem to indicate that, if the question of forcible emancipation came before that
court, they would disallow itV They infer that emancipation could
only occur where the infant has the present ability to earn a living and
has consented to do so and has been earning and receiving wages and
is able to pay for his necessaries.
Authority is well settled that where a father abandons, neglects,
or refuses to support his child, or denies him a home, the law 'will
imply an emancipation so as to defeat the father's claim on the earnings of the child; and such conduct by the father is held to amount to
irrevocable emancipation. But it may readily be seen that such holding is only for the purpose of creating a bar against the father laying
claim to the child's earnings under his common law right. The
father's liability for such an act is not dealt with.
A Kentucky statute provides that any parent who deserts his
child under sixteen years of age, leaving him in destitute circumstances, is guilty of a felony. This seems to be the only legislation
affecting the subject in this state. This statute could be construed to
mean that if the child under sixteen had a visible means of support
and was not destitute, then the father would not be punishable under
the statute; certainly the. statute intends that the father shall not be
penalized if the child is over sixteen, although said child is in indigent circumstances. Doubtless both these constructions are correct
when affecting the felony as created by the statute; but assuming that
they are correct, what of the parent's liability as to misdemeanors
under the common law?
A New York cases holds that, beyond what is required by the
school system, it being compulsory under this system to provide sup.
port and educational facilities until the child is aged sixteen, the
parent's liability thereafter is a matter of fact, consideration being
given to health, resources and station in life of the child. A stronger
case decided in Kentucky$ holds the parents legally bound to support
their children during infancy, even though the children have estates
of their own, unless the parents' estate is limited and the children
have an income ample for their support. Yet another Kentucky case
'Simmons v. Stewart, 198 Ky. 330, 248 S. W. 892 (1923).
'Swift and Co. v. Johnson, 77 C. C. A. 619, 138 Fed. 867 (1905);
Smith v. Gilbert, 80 Ark. 525, 98 S. W. 115 (1906).
' Ky. Stat. 1930, Section 331i-1.
$Matter of Putney, 61 Misc. Rep. 1, 114 N. Y. Supp. 556 (1908).
'First Natl. Bk. v. Green, 114 S. W. 322 (1908) (in accord);
Reynolds' Admr. v. Reynolds, 92 Ky. 556, 18 S. W. 517 (1892); Clement
v. Hughes, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 352, 17 S. W. 285 (1891); Riley v. Riley,
11 Ky. Law Rep. 859 (1890).

K. L. J.-8
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stated by way of dictum that the parents' duty to support does not
necessarily end when the child becomes of age, the question being determined by the facts. 0 This case may be construed to overrule an
earlier Kentucky case" holding that a parent is not legally bound to
support a child after it becomes of legal age, and that no such obligation can be imposed by statute. Yet, if we are to give cognizance
to a very strong inference, even this early Kentucky case recognized
the common law duty to support at least until the child became of
legal age.
A New York statute5 provides a penalty for the abandonment in
destitute circumstances of a child under sixteen. Another New York
statute provides a heavier penalty in the case of such abandonment
of a child under fourteen. These provisions indicate a slight trend
in the law toward lifting the burden of support from the shoulders
of the parent. This trend is evidenced by the omissions in the statutes of the states to provide penalties for nonsupport or abandonment
of children over sixteen years of age. The gap between the age of
sixteeen and legal age, however, is still filled by the common law,
making it a misdemeanor to commit such abandonment. Where injury
has or is being done the infant the law will act to punish,"4 or to
prescribe a remedy. 5 Where no harm is done, and, perhaps, the
infant is benefited by the cutting of parental bonds, the law will remain discreetly silent. 5
HOWARD H. WHrrEUAD.

EQUITY-EQUITABLE
DEATH OF VENDOR.

CONVERSION-OPTION

CONTRACT-

One Bisbee leased certain real estate to two lessees for a period
of two years, and gave these lessees an option to purchase the real
estate at any time within the two years upon the payment of a certain
sum. Almost a year later Bisbee died intestate. A month after Bisbee's death the lessees exercised their option to purchase. The property was conveyed to the lessees by Bisbee's administrator, and the
purchase moifey was ordered to be, and was, distributed as personal
property. The heirs of Bisbee sought to have the order set aside.
Held: for the plaintiffs, who as heirs of Bisbee were entitled to the
'9Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S. W. 67 (1908).
"Commonwealth v. Willis' Exr., 7 Ky. Law Rep. 677 (1886).
"Cahill's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Ch. 41, Section 480.
" Cahill's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Ch. 41, Section 481.
"State v. Herring, 200 Iowa 1105, 205 N. W. 861 (1925); Commonwealth v. Donovan, 187 Ky. 779, 220 S. W. 1081 (1920).
'5Sprlngstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 Pac. 14 (1924);
Sanderson v. Sanderson, 149 Misc. R. 88, 267 N. Y. Supp. 410 (1933).
IsHolland v. Hartley, 171 N. C. 376, 88 S. E. 507 (1916); Memphis
Steel Const. Co. v. Lister, 138 Tenn. 307, 197 S. W. 902 (1917); Cohen
v. Del. L. and W. Ry. Co., 150 Misc. 450, 269 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1934).

